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Abstract
A possible way out of the conundrum of quantum gravity is the proposal that gen-
eral relativity (GR) emerges from an underlying microscopic description. Despite recent
interest in the emergent gravity program within the physics as well as the philosophy com-
munity, an assessment of the theoretical evidence for this idea is lacking at the moment.
We intend to fill this gap in the literature by discussing the main arguments in favour of
the hypothesis that the metric field and its dynamics are emergent. First, we distinguish
between microstructure inspired from GR, such as through quantization or discretization,
and microstructure that is not directly motivated from GR, such as strings, quantum bits
or condensed matter fields. The emergent gravity approach can then be defined as the view
that the metric field and its dynamics are derivable from the latter type of microstructure.
Subsequently, we assess in how far the following properties of (semi-classical) GR are sug-
gestive of underlying microstructure: (1) the metric’s universal coupling to matter fields,
(2) perturbative non-renormalizability, (3) black hole thermodynamics, and (4) the holo-
graphic principle. In the conclusion we formalize the general structure of the plausibility
arguments put forward.
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1 Introduction
Gravity is notoriously harder to quantize than other interactions. It is well-known that
combining general relativity (GR) with quantum mechanics poses several difficulties which
are standardly traced back to the perturbative non-renormalizability of general relativity.
Proponents of quantum gravity (QG) approaches proper (such as loop quantum gravity,
asymptotic safety and causal dynamical triangulation) nevertheless expect that gravity is
after all non-perturbatively renormalizable, and thereby possibly fundamental. In con-
trast, according to other approaches – like string theory1 and emergent gravity accounts by
Sakharov (1968), Jacobson (1995), Padmanabhan (2010), Verlinde (2011), and Hu (2009)
– the gravitational field cannot be fundamental but rather emerges from underlying mi-
crostructure. These approaches can be subsumed under the term “emergent gravity” (EG).
The idea that gravity and spacetime originate from some underlying microscopic reality
in which they do not exist is a widely held belief in, for example, the string theory commu-
nity.2 The possibility that gravitational degrees are rooted in non-gravitational degrees of
freedom is often supported by reference to the AdS/CFT correspondence.3 The AdS/CFT
correspondence, however, only provides a straightforward4 gateway to a theory of emer-
gent gravity under the controversial assumption that the CFT side of the correspondence is
more fundamental than the AdS side. Now, it is precisely the philosopher of physics’ task
to reflect on such current trends in quantum gravity research. In our view a particularly
pressing question in this field is why it is widely believed that gravity is emergent – and
what is meant by the term “emergent gravity” in the first place.
As a matter of fact, it is surprising that the current philosophical literature5 on EG
mainly focuses on notions of emergence or possible implications for QG rather than apprais-
ing general arguments for the emergent nature of GR in the first place! We intend to fill
this gap in the literature by reconstructing and assessing arguments for the high-levelness
of gravity, which are often only implicitly contained in the relevant physics literature.
These arguments do not assume any specific QG model, but rather consist of pointing
out features of gravity which are (at least typically) characteristic of systems with under-
1See Polchinski (2007a,b), Zwiebach (2006) and Becker et al. (2006) for standard textbooks on string theory.
2Cf. Witten (1996), Seiberg (2006), Verlinde (2011).
3See Maldacena (1999) for the original derivation of the AdS/CFT correspondence, and Aharony et al. (2000)
for a comprehensive review.
4For a more nuanced take on the notions of fundamentality and emergence in the context of AdS/CFT, see
Rickles (2013), Teh (2013), Dieks et al. (2015), de Haro (2017a) and Vistarini (2017).
5Cf. Bain (2013a), Mattingly (2014), Knox (2013), Crowther (2013, 2016), Dieks et al. (2015), de Haro
(2017a) and Carlip (2014). Admittedly, Carlip’s article is an appraisal of the emergent gravity program, but
it only focuses on the challenges for such a program rather than the positive hints for the emergent nature of
gravity.
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lying microstructure. In other words, certain features – ranging from universal coupling
to black hole thermodynamics – allow for mounting arguments from analogy to the effect
that the metric field and its dynamics are emergent. Arguably, these gravitational features
even remain “mysteries” in a fundamental take on the metric and appear to be in need of
explanation, which however can be easily achieved in an emergent gravity framework.
The matter is worth exploring in particular in light of the interesting consequences a
high-level view of GR could have for the conception of spacetime: it serves promoting a
physical view of the metric as one field among others, as opposed to a conventional (geomet-
ric) spacetime view as advocated by Friedman (2014) and Maudlin (2012). Hence emergent
gravity is very much in line with the particle physics view on GR (the “spin-2 approach”)
advocated by Feynman (2003) and Weinberg (1979), and with the dynamical approach to
relativity by Brown (2005). In any case, if one agrees with the call to philosophers by
Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) to engage with conceptual problems in the development of
theories of QG, an assessment of the indications for the emergent nature of gravity will
count as a sensible, if not necessary, contribution.
This paper is organised as follows. We start out in section 2 by clarifying our notions
of emergence, microscopic structure and high-levelness. Ultimately, we provide a definition
of emergent gravity which we take to capture best what is meant by emergent gravity in
the physics literature. In section 3, we work through individual features of gravity which
can at least naively be taken as suggestive of emergence. In section 4 we end by assessing
the general structure of the arguments put forward.
2 What is emergent gravity?
2.1 Definition of emergent gravity
Emergent gravity is roughly taken to be the view that gravity arises due to the “collective
action of the dynamics of more fundamental non-gravitational degrees of freedom” (Huggett
and Wu¨thrich (2013)). The aim of this section is to sharpen this rough characterization
of emergent gravity by providing answers to the following core questions: (i) “emergence
of what?”, (ii) “emergence from what?” and (iii) “what kind of emergence?”. The first
question asks what properties of gravitational physics are actually emergent. The second
is concerned with the existence and nature of the underlying microstructure, and the third
focuses on the emergence relation between the gravitational and non-gravitational degrees
of freedom. In the next three subsections we treat these questions separately noting though
that (i) and (ii) are not fully independent.
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2.1.1 Emergent aspects of gravity
Which aspects of gravity are emergent? Needless to say the answer to this question depends
on what we take gravity to be. A gravitational theory has for instance been defined by
Thorne et al. (1973) as a spacetime theory that reproduces Kepler’s laws.6 In any case,
our current best theory of gravity is GR, which formally encompasses a differentiable,
4-dimensional manifold with tensor fields on top. One of the tensor fields necessarily
corresponds to a Lorentzian metric field g which has the usual chronogeometric meaning.7
The metric field satisfies the Einstein equations, Gab =
8piG
c4
Tab, which relate the Einstein
tensor Gab to the stress-energy tensor Tab obtained from all other tensor fields (the so-
called matter fields). The matter fields themselves are subject to further (possibly coupled)
dynamical equations.
One might think that ideally in an emergent model of GR all three aspects emerge
together: the manifold, the metric field and its dynamics.8 The emergence of the manifold
is, however, somewhat less important, since its physical significance is doubtful. Arguably,
the (active) diffeomorphism invariance of fields in GR bereaves the manifold points of any
“thisness” and renders it as a mathematical scaffolding structure to define physical fields
on (cf. the hole argument of Earman and Norton (1987)).
In some approaches, such as the thermodynamic route to GR by Jacobson (1995), the
metric field is first of all given ab initio, and then its (Einstein) equations of motion are
derived. We think, however, that a genuine account of emergent gravity should include
the emergence of both the metric field and its dynamics (rather than just the dynamics).
This is not to say that Jacobson’s account is not a form of emergent gravity. In fact, in
section 2.3 we categorize it as an emergent gravity scenario, because the thermodynamic
interpretation of the dynamical equations associated to the metric field g naturally leads
to the emergent nature of g itself.
In the next subsection, we will further see that not only the metric field and its dynamics
are emergent aspects of gravity, but also the graviton – the spin-2 particle that mediates the
gravitational force – should count as “gravitational” (and hence as emergent). According to
6We thank Dennis Lehmkuhl for referring us to this definition. However, this definition seems to unfairly
exclude modifications of GR (such as higher curvature theories and bimetric theories, like TeVeS) as gravitational
theories.
7In particular, sufficiently accurate clocks travelling along a wordline segment γ will display a reading propor-
tional to the worldline interval ∆s =
∫
γ
gabdX
adXb. Whether the metric intrinsically contains chronogeometric
signifiance or gains it dynamically, is up to philosophical debate. It is, however, not relevant for the characteri-
zation of emergent aspects of gravitation.
8Lam and Wu¨thrich (2017) argue that GR does not necessarily have to be recovered completely in such a
scenario: a functionally adequate subset of notions of GR or empirically adequate modifications of it might be
sufficient already.
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the spin-2 approach the metric field and its dynamics namely arise through the self-coupling
of the graviton, cf. Deser (1970). If we viewed the spin-2 field as non-gravitational, then GR
would emerge from quantized GR, which is however against the intuition behind emergent
gravity.
2.1.2 Two types of microtheories
In the EG literature, gravity is unanimously taken to be emergent from (novel) microstruc-
ture underlying the metric degrees of freedom. For instance, Carlip (2014) defines emergent
gravity as:
“[...] the basic picture is that gravity, and perhaps space or spacetime them-
selves, are collective manifestations of very different underlying degrees of free-
dom.” (p. 200)
In a similar spirit, Sindoni (2012) writes:
“As a provisional definition, we will intend as emergence of a given theory as a
reorganization of the degrees of freedom of a certain underlying model in a way
that leads to a regime in which the relevant degrees of freedom are qualitatively
different from the microscopic ones.” (p. 2)
Padmanabhan (2010, 2016), Hu (2009) and Verlinde (2011) employ similar notions of EG.
They tend to compare (or even equate) the idea of gravity having underlying microstructure
(sometimes referred to as “atoms of spacetime”) to the sense in which thermodynamic or
hydrodynamic systems have underlying microstructure.
However, despite the apparent consensus in the literature, this definition of emergent
gravity is problematic.9 In general, the received definition of emergent gravity in
terms of very different underlying degrees of freedom, or novel microstructure simply suffers
from vagueness. It is vague both with respect to qualifiers like “very” or “novel”, and the
characterization of what there actually is supposed to be over and above gravity (“different
degrees of freedom” or “microstructure”). In the following, we give three major instances
of changes in degrees of freedom for which it is not a priori clear whether they should be
counted as “very different” degrees of freedom or not.
Firstly, the discretization of a theory of gravity changes its degrees of freedom in some
sense. After all, the continuous version can only be reproduced upon coarse-graining again.
But, according to the EG proponent, the degrees of freedom of a discretized theory should
not be “very” or “qualitatively” different from the degrees of freedom of the original theory.
9Admittedly, some authors like Sindoni (2012) do not even attempt to give a fully worked-out definition.
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If that were the case, loop quantum gravity (LQG) and causal set theory would count as
instances of emergent gravity, which would make the definition of EG too broad.
Secondly, quantization of a theory does to some extent change the theory’s degrees
of freedom. As quantization generically leads to discretization of classically continuous
quantities – such as energy, angular momentum, and possibly even spacetime structure –
coarse-graining is typically part of restoring the classical limit (together with suppressing
superposition effects). However, quantization does not necessarily entail a change of degrees
of freedom, at least not in a Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics. Whether or not
quantization leads to “qualitatively different” degrees of freedom depends on the specific
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Preferably the definition should not depend upon
the interpretation of quantum mechanics at play.
Thirdly, in a quantum field theory (QFT) setting, the renormalization group flow de-
scribes a change of theories under a coarse-graining operation. Coarse-graining here cor-
responds to integrating out high energy modes. If one starts with a renormalizable theory
which is well-behaved up to arbitrarily high energies, then coarse-graining will produce
effective field theories which are only valid up to a certain level of energy. Despite a change
of its degrees of freedom under renormalization (energy modes are integrated out), the
resulting theory will not necessarily involve “qualitatively” different degrees of freedom.
Generally speaking, the renormalization group flow only changes the coupling constants of
a quantum field theory. In the context of gravity, asymptotic safety claims that quantum
general relativity (quantum GR10) is subject to a renormalization group flow such that it
eventually runs into a UV-fixed point in theory space. The only difference in the degrees
of freedom of low-energy and high-energy versions of quantum GR is then encoded in the
UV cut-off of the corresponding theory.
The three examples above show that the received definition of EG is problematic, since
it is unclear whether discretization, quantization, and renormalization lead to “qualitatively
different” degrees of freedom. This issue is important because we want to distinguish EG
from other quantum gravity accounts that arise from discretizing, quantizing or renormal-
izing GR. One could attempt to sharpen the characterization of the degrees of freedom
underlying gravity by calling them “non-gravitational” (see also Huggett and Wu¨thrich
(2013)), but this remains unsatisfactory as long as one has no clear notion of “gravita-
tional”. We already alluded in the previous subsection to the problem that we cannot
straightforwardly give a definition of “gravitational” in terms of GR alone, without run-
10By “quantum GR” we denote any form of quantization approach turning GR into a quantum theory,
including perturbative quantum gravity, canonical quantum gravity, loop quantum gravity, causal dynamical
triangulation, and more; but not, for instance, string theory and causal set theory.
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ning the risk of calling theories underlying GR non-gravitational, which are however not
at all instances of emergent gravity. For example, the spin-2 approach, LQG, and causal
set theory are possible quantum theories underlying GR that we would like to exclude as
cases of emergent gravity.
We now propose to circumvent this issue by introducing a distinction between two types
of microtheories, i.e. two types of theories underlying a theory T :11
We call a theory M1 underlying a theory T a type I microtheory to T if and
only if it is inspired12 from T (for instance through discretization, quantization
or renormalization). An underlying theory M2 to theory T is called a type II
microtheory if and only if it is not directly inspired or motivated13 from T .
The structure linked to a microtheory is called microstructure.
A theory is called emergent if and only if there exists an underlying type II
microtheory to it.
A type I microtheory to GR can now coherently be counted as gravitational, whereas a
type II microtheory to GR is by definition non-gravitational since gravity emerges from
it. Another advantage of this new definition of emergent gravity in terms of type II
microtheories is that the microstructure associated to these theories is automatically novel,
because it cannot be inspired from gravity. Examples of possible type I microtheories to
GR are causal set theory, loop quantum gravity and other quantum gravity approaches
proper. This is in line with the general idea of emergent gravity being something over and
above quantum gravity proper (see Carlip (2014), Padmanabhan (2010), Jacobson (1995)).
Furthermore, string theory would count as an instance of type II microtheory to GR.14
One might object to our definition of emergent gravity that a quantum GR approach
can already lead to a quite different picture of spacetime. For instance, many solutions
in LQG will not in any sense reduce to general relativistic spacetimes. So our distinction
of quantum gravity approaches based on whether or not “they are inspired from GR”
11We necessarily require microtheories to T to reduce to T in an appropriate limit, such as a classical or
low-energy limit.
12We would like to acknowledge Jeremy Butterfield for suggesting this term to us, and thank Claus Beisbart
and Sam Fletcher for pressing us on our definition.
13One might argue that notions as “inspired” or “motivated” from are as vague as the notions “qualitatively”
or “very different”, criticized above. However, despite their granted vagueness, the former notions allow for a
more precise distinction between what is referred to as EG in the literature and what is not, as we demonstrate
below.
14Arguably, perturbative string theory counts as a type I microtheory, as its target space with a dynamic back-
ground metric is inspired from GR, whereas non-perturbative string theory is a type II microtheory underlying
GR, since it does not involve any kind of Lorentzian metric.
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seems to be independent of how radically relativistic spacetimes emerge from underlying
microstructure. Our concern is, however, not with radicalness as we do not and cannot
claim that quantum GR approaches do not provide spectacular instances of emergence.
But rather than distinguishing approaches based on the radicalness of emergence at play,
our proposed definition of EG is designed to provide a demarcation line between what is
generally understood as the emergence of gravity and other accounts (such as loop quantum
gravity and causal set theory). With this definition at hand, we are then able to evaluate
the plausibility arguments put forward in section 3, in particular in how far they are able
to establish the emergence of gravity. The concrete criterion of whether or not an account
has been inspired from GR seems to fulfill this practical purpose best.
As a final note we emphasize that, although proper quantum gravity and emergent
gravity approaches are defined in a different way (as originating from type I and type II
microtheories, respectively) they are not necessarily in conflict with one another.15 They
are trivially compatible as any physical theory (and so even the most successful theory of
quantum gravity proper) could in principle turn out to be underlied by a more fundamental
theory.16 This general skepticism becomes most interesting if it is connected to concrete
approaches which are standardly believed to be complete, but are then shown to have
underlying structure nevertheless. Quantized gravity approaches like loop quantum gravity
or causal dynamical triangulation (instances of QG) could in fact be underlied by string
theory (an instance of EG) even if they are UV-complete. An appraisal of emergent gravity
should take this general skeptic’s point into account, if it does not want emergent gravity
to sound like a cheap option always available.
2.1.3 Different notions of emergence
With respect to the third question – “what kind of emergence?” – it is important to point
out that philosophers and physicists use the word “emergent” differently, and themselves
not at all coherently either.17 Philosophers tend to define emergence as the failure of
15An often expressed sentiment by proponents of emergent gravity is that gravity should not be quantized if
gravity is emergent (cf. Jacobson (1995), Padmanabhan (2010), Verlinde (2011)). One can, however, prima facie
equally quantize high-level as well as low-level theories. Whether to quantize or not to quantize, is a question
of the theory’s formal nature, not of the level of reality we apply it to. For instance, quantization of condensed
matter field theories is unproblematic and is well-known to yield quasi-particles, like phonons.
16This skepticism is quite conventional within a quantum field theory setting. In lack of knowledge of possible
higher energy modes at play in a perturbatively considered QFT, a naively fundamental (i.e. renormalizable)
QFT might equally be just effective (see Cao and Schweber (1993)).
17We would like to thank Karen Crowther for sharing an unpublished note, in which she distinguished between
the philosopher’s, the physicist’s and the philosopher of physics’ usage of the word “emergence”. This distinction
goes back to Nickles (1973).
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reduction. A theory (property) is then called emergent from another more fundamental
theory (property) if the former is not derivable or explainable from the latter.
In contrast, philosophers of physics mostly work with Butterfield’s notion of emer-
gence in terms of supervenience on the one hand, and novelty and robustness on the other
hand.18 Supervenience of a theory (property) on another (standardly more fundamental)
theory (property) means that there can be no change in the former theory (property) with-
out a change in the latter theory (property). The problem with this notion of emergence, of
course, lies in its deference of the difficulty in defining emergence to that of defining robust-
ness and novelty (similar to how the philosopher’s sense of emergence seems to ultimately
depend on the definition of reducibility). Following Butterfield (2011), we take “novel”
properties to mean features which are not contained in the microstructure, whereas “ro-
bust” properties are properties that are not sensitive to (and somehow independent from)
the specifics of the underlying structure.
Lastly, physicists often use the word “emergence” in the sense of reducibility, that
is derivability or explainability of a certain structure from another one. Take a string
theorist claiming that he/she derived general relativity from perturbative string theory in
a low-energy limit: he/she will probably call this an instance of emergent gravity. More
concretely, Seiberg (2006) takes space and time to be emergent if they “will not be present
in the fundamental formulation of the theory and will appear as approximate semiclassical
notions in the macroscopic world” (p. 1). Here, Seiberg identifies emergence of spacetime
with its derivability (through semiclassical approximation) from a microscopic structure.
Which notion of emergence is applicable to emergent gravity? We should not forget
that the notion of emergent gravity is introduced by physicists – not by philosophers. It is
thus plainly wrong to presume that the notion of emergence in EG should be interpreted in
the philosopher’s sense. Rather, it is the physicist’s notion which seems to apply here – as
physicists expect GR to be reducible to more fundamental microscopic theories – thereby
excluding the philosopher’s notion from the start.
Still, we do not take the physicist’s reduction to exhaustively specify the relationship
between the metric and its (putative) underlying microstructure. There is arguably an as-
pect of novelty and robustness in the emerging metric structure which need to be accounted
for.19 First, the non-gravitational degrees of freedom (as defined in the previous section)
18This understanding of emergence in terms of dependence (supervenience) and independence (novelty or
autonomy) is arguably not the only one in the current philosophy of physics’ literature – albeit that it is very
dominant. One might for instance also consider pure epistemic emergence in light of unpredictability of one level
from another. Also see Rickles (2013), Crowther (2016), Vistarini (2017) and de Haro (2017b) – among others –
for more recent work.
19Some physicists might also have this notion of emergence in mind. The previous distinction between the
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are qualitatively different from (and hence novel with respect to) the gravitational degrees
of freedom, as the former are not inspired from the latter. Secondly, albeit more specifically,
in thermodynamic approaches by Jacobson, Verlinde and Padmanabhan, gravity is viewed
as robust with respect to the underlying microstructure, in the sense that it only depends
on coarse-grained notions such as entropy and temperature. Thus, the notion of emergence
in emergent gravity seems most suitably characterized by the philosopher of physics’ sense.
This also seems to capture best how advocates of EG models use the word “emergence”.
2.2 Relation to unification, emergent spacetime and EFT
In the previous section we tried to get hold of the notion of emergent gravity – as used
in practice – by characterizing it through a microtheory which is underlying GR but not
inspired from it (type II microtheory). We will now compare the notion of emergent gravity
to related ones.
Unification. The quest for the unification of gravity with the other fundamental inter-
actions of Nature is logically compatible with emergent gravity, as defined above. If
gravity is emergent, and unification is realized at a certain energy scale, then also the
other interactions might have type II microstructure. In a sense the idea of emergent
gravity then loses its pre-eminent status. For example, in the unification scenario
of string theory all interactions are on a par with each other and are equally emer-
gent from the underlying microstructure of strings and D-branes. In other emergent
gravity approaches such as those of Verlinde (2011, 2017) and Jacobson (1995, 2016),
typically only gravity is viewed as emergent whereas the other forces are treated as
fundamental. This, however, does not exclude the scenario that all forces eventually
emerge from a joint microstructure. But the approach to such a unified description
could be different from other unification scenarios such as string theory, in the sense
that gravity is expected to emerge prior and in a qualitatively different way from the
other forces when going up the energy scale.
Emergent spacetime. In the current GR era “gravity” is often used synonymously with
“spacetime” so that, at first sight, “emergent spacetime” and “emergent gravity” seem
to be synonyms. The usage of the term “emergent spacetime”, however, comprises
many different senses in which typical aspects of spacetime – such as dimensionality,
causal and chronogeometric structure, continuity of space and time, and more – turn
out to be non-fundamental. For example, Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) use the term
three senses of emergence should be understood as a general labeling, not specific to the context of QG. We thank
Christian Wu¨thrich for pressing us on this point.
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for both the emergence of classical spacetime from their quantum versions, as in LQG,
and the emergence of spacetime from another spatiotemporal structure, as in con-
densed matter approaches, or non-spatiotemporal structure, as in non-commutative
geometry. On our account the former type of emergence is not an instance of EG,
whereas the latter is.20
Effective field theory. Within a particle physics or quantum field theory approach to GR
the Einstein-Hilbert action is standardly rendered as a low-energy effective action (cf.
Burgess (2004)). Similarly, perturbative quantum GR is then simply understood as
a low-energy effective field theory (EFT) (cf. Donoghue (2012)). The EFT view and
emergent gravity only make contact if the gravitational low energies degrees of freedom
are qualitatively different from the high-energy degrees of freedoms (for example if the
spin-2 particle is a composite particle). Mere effectiveness of a field theory, however,
does not yet entail that its higher energetic versions feature qualitatively different
degrees of freedom. For example, in the asymptotic safety approach to gravity the
gravitational action changes with the energy scale while the metric degrees of freedom
remain fundamental.
2.3 Taxonomy of accounts: top-down vs. bottom-up
In the previous sections we have given a broad definition of emergent gravity and demar-
cated this notion from related ones. In this section we give a quick overview of the several
models of emergent gravity and different approaches towards finding such models.
One could taxonomize the emergent gravity program in (at least) two natural ways:
either by qualitatively distinguishing different models from each other, or by differentiating
between research strategies for establishing the emergent nature of gravity. Regarding the
first taxonomy, Bain (2013b) and Carlip (2014) have classified different models in terms of
the nature of the underlying microstructure. In some models the underlying structure is
spatiotemporal, whereas in others any sense of ordinary spacetime itself is emergent and
hence the microstructure is necessarily non-spatiotemporal.
In this paper we are more concerned with the second kind of taxonomy. We distinguish
between two different strategies towards emergent gravity: (1) bottom-up accounts that
start from the underlying microstructure and work their way upwards towards GR; and
(2) top-down accounts that start from the emergent gravitational structure and try to find
20Emergence of spacetime does not necessarily entail the emergence of matter fields. Only without a straight-
forward rule to assign the currently known matter fields to the underlying degrees of freedom of spacetime, the
emergence of spacetime implies the emergent nature of matter as well.
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universal features of the underlying microstructure.21 Since finding a detailed microscopic
model of emergent gravity is generally quite hard, some authors just study analogies be-
tween gravitational features of GR (or QFT in curved spacetime) and standardly emergent
structures (such as thermodynamics or hydrodynamics). Such top-down accounts do not
establish gravity to be emergent, but should often be taken as hints towards the emer-
gence of gravity. Conversely, bottom-up accounts typically start from microscopic theories
such as condensed matter physics, quantum information theory or string theory, and try
to derive GR.
Below we list different top-down and bottom-up accounts (see Carlip (2014) for more
EG accounts):
Bottom-up accounts. The archetypical example is induced gravity by Sakharov (1968),
and variants thereof (see Visser (2002) for a review), in which the Einstein-Hilbert
action appears as a term in the one-loop effective action of matter fields. Other exam-
ples include: non-perturbative string theory, such as the matrix model for M-theory
by Banks et al. (1997); some version of the AdS/CFT correspondence, where the con-
formal field theory is viewed as fundamental and the bulk spacetime as emergent (cf.
Berenstein (2006), Horowitz and Polchinski (2006)); and possibly analog models of
gravity, such as acoustics in a moving fluid (cf. Unruh (1995), Barcelo et al. (2005)).
Top-down accounts. Typical examples in this category are derivations of the Einstein
equations from thermodynamics or hydrodynamics, such as by Jacobson (1995), Pad-
manabhan (2010) and Verlinde (2011). Recently, Jacobson (2016) proposed a new
derivation of the Einstein equations from the entanglement properties of the vacuum.
Another approach by Hu (2009) is to extend the semi-classical field equations by
adding fluctuation terms on the energy/matter side.
3 Hints towards an emergent nature
In this section we will construct and criticize arguments to the effect of an emergent gravity
paradigm. Naively speaking, there are two strategies for arguing that gravity is emergent:
(1) to look for indications in our best theories of gravity (GR, its higher derivative extensions
or semi-classical gravity) for an emergent paradigm; and (2) to directly present a model
for the supposed microstructure from which gravity emerges.
The first strategy is to look for analogies between (X) gravitational theories and (Y)
other theories said to have microstructure, such as thermodynamics or hydrodynamics. One
21‘Bottom’ (‘top’) here refers to UV (IR) physics, which is opposite the convention of Hu (2009).
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then hopes to demonstrate the emergent nature of gravity by establishing a sufficiently
strong analogy between (X) and (Y) in a relevant sense. Certain features of gravity –
mainly its universality, perturbative non-renormalizability, its thermodynamic features and
its holographic nature – allow for mounting such arguments from analogy. Arguably, these
gravitational features even remain “mysteries” in a fundamental take on the metric and
appear to be in need of explanation, which however can be easily achieved in an emergent
gravity framework. We call this the top-down strategy (similarly to the already mentioned
top-down accounts).
But how could a top-down strategy ever do more than establishing the plausibility of
an emergent nature? Strictly speaking, it cannot do more. But philosophy of physics,
among other things, has to make sense of the conceptual aspects of a theory, and read the
signals that come from these conceptual aspects. If there are thus signals calling for an
emergent reading of gravity, then the philosopher of physics has to make them public. The
real question is, rather, how strong these signals are, i.e. how to construct arguments from
them and consequently assess their relative strengths.
The second strategy at worst only gives a proof-of-concept for the emergence of grav-
ity. At best, it provides a genuine candidate for the microstructure underlying gravity.
String/M-theory as well as condensed matter systems from which gravity emerges are ex-
amples of such candidates. We call this the bottom-up strategy (similarly to the above
mentioned bottom-up accounts).
In the current paper we only follow the top-down strategy. Below we analyze four hints
for the emergent nature of gravity: the universality of gravity (subsection 3.1), the pertur-
bative non-renormalizability (subsection 3.2), black hole thermodynamics (subsection 3.3),
and the holographic principle (subsection 3.4). We will see that the latter three hints are
closely related.
3.1 Universality of gravity
Universal attraction is, of course, a well-known property of gravity, but first we want to
clarify what exactly is meant by this type of universality, both in Newtonian gravity and
in general relativity. We will then be sufficiently equipped to assess whether the universal
nature of gravity hints at its emergence.
In Newtonian gravity, one can distinguish between two aspects of the universality of the
gravitational force: its universal scope and its universal strength. The first universal aspect
is that all particles have a gravitational mass, and hence attract each other as described
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by Newton’s law of gravitation
F = G
m1m2
r2
.
Hence, Newton’s law of gravitation is universal in scope as it applies to any two Newtonian
objects of a given mass. The other fundamental forces (electromagnetic, weak and strong
force) do not have such a general scope as gravity. The electromagnetic force, for example,
only applies to particles with electric charge. A related important difference between
gravitation and electromagnetism is that there exists only one type of gravitational charge,
whereas there are two types of electric charges in nature.
The second universal feature of Newtonian gravity is its universal strength: gravity is
‘equally strong’ for different types of freely falling bodies. More precisely, two test bodies
in a gravitational field which are not acted upon by other forces, such as air resistance,
move with the same acceleration irrespective of their mass and internal composition. In
the literature this property is known as the ‘weak equivalence principle’ (WEP) or as the
‘universality of free fall’, and it holds as a consequence of the proportionality between
inertial and gravitational mass.22 Within the ontology of Newtonian theory, WEP is an
extra assumption on top of the three laws of Newtonian mechanics, which is based on
empirical evidence (in contrast to GR, where it is built into the formalism). Taken together,
the universal scope of gravity and its universal strength imply that all test bodies in a
gravitational field fall equally fast in the absence of other forces.
In general relativity, or any sound relativistic theory of gravity, both of these universal
features are of course present, albeit in a different guise. First, the universal scope is
extended to everything that carries energy: the gravitational field in GR acts on all sources
of stress-energy.23 Second, the WEP is also an indisputable principle in general relativity,
and it even forms one of the foundations of the theory. One of the main differences, though,
between Newtonian gravity and general relativity is that freely falling bodies in GR are
moving inertially with respect to a local inertial frame, and hence no gravitational force
is acting on them (in contrast to the Newtonian picture of gravity as a force). In fact,
the trajectories of freely falling test bodies in GR are identified with timelike geodesics of
the metric. Hence, the WEP does not follow in GR from the equality between the inertial
and gravitational mass – since these are not fundamental notions in GR – but it is rather
embodied by the fact that geodesic motion is independent of the particular constitution of
test bodies.24
22Cf. Will (2006).
23In GR (or any other metric theory of gravity) the metric field does not only act on sources of stress-energy,
but it is also acted upon by these sources. Hence, the metric is a dynamical field in such theories of gravity.
24Following Brown and Read (2016).
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Furthermore, in standard treatments of GR the term ‘universality’ is often attributed to
the coupling of the metric to matter fields. Will (2006), for example, defines the universal
nature of this coupling as follows:25
“The property that all non-gravitational fields should couple in the same manner
to a single gravitational field is sometimes called ‘universal coupling’.” (p. 68)
In this definition both of the universal features mentioned above are apparent: the coupling
has a universal scope since it applies to all non-gravitational fields, and it has universal
strength as it always occurs in the same manner. Admittedly, the characterization of
universal strength is rather vague, but what is probably meant here by “the same manner”
is that the coupling between matter fields and the one gravitational field is always minimal
(which excludes curvature-matter couplings in the equations of motion of the matter fields).
It should be noted, though, that the notion of universal coupling actually goes beyond the
two universal features considered above. Universal coupling is namely a central aspect of the
Einstein equivalence principle (EEP), which is a stronger claim than the weak equivalence
principle.26 The EEP states that in any local Lorentz frames the non-gravitational laws of
physics must take on their familiar special relativistic forms (cf. Misner et al. (1973)). This
principle ensures that the outcome of any non-gravitational experiment is independent of
the spacetime location, and is hence more powerful than the WEP.27
Now, the universality of gravity has been put forward by some authors as a hint towards
the emergence of gravity. We will analyze their arguments, and specifically pay attention
to which aspect of universality (universal scope or strength) is being used in the arguments.
In our analysis we take ‘universal coupling’ to be the most precise definition of universality
of gravity in GR.
To begin with, Verlinde (2011) argues for emergent gravity as follows in his introduction:
“Of all forces of Nature gravity is clearly the most universal. Gravity influ-
ences and is influenced by everything that carries an energy, and is intimately
connected with the structure of space-time. The universal nature of gravity
25This definition of universal coupling dates back to work by Thorne et al. (1973). They have also proven that
a Lagrangian-based relativistic theory of gravity is universally coupled if and only if it is a metric theory.
26It is conjectured, though, by Leonard Schiff that any complete and self-consistent gravitation theory that
obeys WEP must also obey EEP. See Will (2006) for an overview of the plausibility arguments in favour of
Schiff’s conjecture.
27As pointed out by Read et al. (2017), the EEP in its usual form – contra common belief – does not hold
strictly. The standard Maxwell wave equations in curved spacetime, for instance, do feature curvature couplings,
and thus provide an example of equations of motion in the general relativistic context which – even at a point
– do not take their special relativistic form. As a result, the EEP is actually only realized effectively in GR,
namely in the case that local curvature effects are negligible.
16
is also demonstrated by the fact that its basic equations closely resemble the
laws of thermodynamics and hydrodynamics. So far, there has not been a clear
explanation for this resemblance.” (p. 1)
Admittedly, Verlinde at first sight seems to conflate (or at least directly equate) two differ-
ent notions of universality, namely the universal coupling of the gravitational interaction
and the universal applicability of thermodynamics and hydrodynamics (also to GR). How-
ever, we take him to promote the view that universal coupling of gravity, on the one hand,
and the applicability of thermodynamics to GR, on the other hand, find a common cause
explanation in some kind of coarse-graining process. He subsequently points out that these
universal aspects of gravity would be explained by the emergence of gravity.
The idea that the universal attraction of gravity hints at underlying (non-trivial) mi-
crostructure already dates back (at least) to Feynman. In section 1.5 of the Lectures on
Gravitation Feynman (2003) suggested the following:
“The fact of a universal attraction might remind us of the situation in molecular
physics; we know that all molecules attract one another by a force which at long
distances goes like 1/r6. This we understand in terms of dipole moments which
are induced by fluctuations in the charge distributions of molecules. That this
is universal is well known from the fact that all substances may be made to
condense by cooling them sufficiently. Well, one possibility is that gravitation
may be some attraction due to similar fluctuations in something, we do not
know just what, perhaps having to do with charge.” (p. 15)
Feynman raises the interesting possibility that gravity might be a high-level interaction,
or in his words “that gravitation is a consequence of something that we already know, but
that we have not calculated correctly” (p. 15). To make this point, he suggests that the
universal coupling property of gravity might equally be a result of coarse-graining as the
dipole expansion for a composition of molecules. All molecules attract each other with
the same force – given by the 1/r6-dipole expansion – when seen from a sufficiently large
distance. Since the same applies to gravity – all particles attract each other with the same
1/r2-force – one could think that this is also the result of a multipole expansion, induced
by fluctuations in some underlying microstructure. Finally, note that Feynman uses both
aspects of universality in his argument: the universal scope (all molecules attract each
other) and the universal strength (the force between them is always the same).
Now, based on these ideas of Verlinde and Feynman we can construct the following
argument from universality towards EG. We will use the similarity between hydrodynam-
ics and gravitation to make the argument more concrete. First of all, hydrodynamics and
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gravity are both universal in scope and in strength. Also in hydrodynamics of uncharged
fluids the motion of all test bodies in a fluid is in a sense the same, i.e. their trajectory does
not depend on their internal structure or constitution. In hydrodynamics, the universal
scope and strength are the result of the coarse-graining of the underlying microstructure.
Different microstructures (such as different types of atoms) lead to the same smooth hy-
drodynamic description. In a similar fashion, the universal coupling of gravity could also
be the result of coarse-graining. This argument for EG can be formalized as follows:
1. Universality in hydrodynamics implies coarse-graining.
2. Coarse graining implies type II microstructure.
3. Universal coupling of gravity is similar to universality in hydrodynamics.
4. ∴ Universal coupling of gravity implies type II microstructure.
We take premise (1) to be largely uncontroversial. Premise (2) is, however, easy to attack
as renormalization group theory provides a straightforward counterexample to it. Coarse-
graining could also follow from the renormalization group flow, and hence be due to type I
microstructure (as discussed in section 2.1.2). Premise (3) can be attacked from a geomet-
rical view28 of the metric field: the metric field in some sense plays the role of spacetime
and, therefore, the universal coupling between the metric field and matter fields is to be
expected. According to this view, the universality of gravity is a natural consequence of
the fact that it relates to the general framework of spacetime, and is hence not similar to
the universality in hydrodynamics. However, this specific criticism on premise (3) is moot
if the geometric view of the metric field in GR is moot. A rebuttal of the geometric view
can, for instance, be based on the dynamical approach to relativity by Brown (2005).
Thus, we conclude that the universal coupling property of gravity is with no doubt
striking. But whether it can be taken as a valuable hint for the high-level nature of gravity
is far from clear.
3.2 Perturbative non-renormalizability
A generic quantum field theory contains divergences. In a perturbative series expansion of a
QFT, these divergences manifest themselves in loop terms, which involve an integration over
arbitrarily high momenta. As a sort of technical cure, these divergences can be absorbed
into a proper redefinition of the coupling constants of the QFT. A theory is commonly
28See for example Maudlin (2012).
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called renormalizable if only a finite number of coupling constants need to be redefined to
remove the mentioned divergences.29
A still influential tradition in quantum field theory, dating back to Bethe, regards only
renormalizable quantum field theories as good candidates for fundamental theories (cf. Cao
(1998), section 8.3).30 Such a view builds on the presuppositions that fundamental theories
should be predictive, and that only renormalizable theories can be predictive in arbitrary
energy regimes. The latter presupposition is based on the strict definition of predictivity
that a theory possesses predictive power if it contains a finite number of parameters – which
makes (non-)renormalizable theories, by definition, (non-)predictive.
This traditional view has important consequences for the (non)-fundamentality of quan-
tum GR. It is generally believed that GR, viewed as a quantum field theory, is per-
turbatively non-renormalizable. This is often presented as a consequence of the nega-
tive mass dimension of Newton’s constant (gravity’s coupling constant).31 Although the
power-counting argument is generically a good criterion to judge whether a theory is renor-
malizable or not; it is rather heuristic, and neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion
for renormalizability (see for instance Peskin and Schroeder (1995), section 10.1). More
precisely, quantum GR has been established to be non-renormalizable, up to 2-loop order
(Goroff and Sagnotti (1986)). It is only an expectation, albeit not a theorem, that quantum
GR is also divergent at all orders in a perturbative expansion.
Thus, according to the traditional view, GR’s (expected) non-renormalizability makes
it a non-fundamental theory and thus hints at an emergent nature of the theory. The
argument can be formalized as follows:
1. Non-renormalizability implies non-predictivity.
2. Non-predictivity implies non-fundamentality.
3. (Quantum) GR is non-renormalizable.
4. ∴ (Quantum) GR is non-fundamental.
29The definition of renormalizability is independent of the perturbative/non-perturbative distinction. In par-
ticular, a perturbatively renormalizable QFT is generically still divergent in the sense that the perturbative series
is a divergent but asymptotic series. Note though that a perturbative series may still define a QFT uniquely.
30The renormalizability of a theory alone cannot completely establish its fundamentality. This follows from the
(physical) possibility that there exist higher, but strongly suppressed, energy modes which are not captured by
the QFT under consideration. Hence, it might be the case that the QFT is the result of coarse-graining from yet
another higher energetic QFT. In this respect, Cao and Schweber (1993) rightly advocate (1) an epistemological
anti-foundationalism and (2) a plurality in QFT ontology.
31The mass dimension of Newton’s constant is [G] = 2− d, where d is the number of spacetime dimensions,
which means that a gravitational theory is power counting non-renormalizable for d > 2.
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Let us now assess the validity of the three assumptions that feature in this argument.
Premise (1) is true by definition. We take this definition of (non-)predictivity to be rather
uncontroversial, with the caveat, of course, that GR can be predictive at a certain low-
energy scale (say in the solar system) but non-predictive at the Planck scale. Premise
(2) only seems acceptable if one regards physical theories to be solely constructed for
predictive purposes, and nothing more. Only then can we straightforwardly categorize a
theory which is not predictive to arbitrary high energies as non-fundamental. Standard
accounts of physical theories, though, also value other explanatory features than mere
predictivity, such as their ability to explain structures of the world. Therefore, a more
generous – in other words, less narrow – account of theories than that of Bethe can simply
accept that a fundamental theory of the world turns out to be unpredictive in certain
regimes, as long as it sufficiently satisfactory in other aspects.
Whereas premise (2) is subject to philosophical controversy, premise (3) is simply
an open question within the current state of physics. Quantum GR has so far only
been convincingly established to be perturbatively non-renormalizable, and there exist
after all paradigm cases of theories which are perturbatively non-renormalizable, but non-
perturbatively renormalizable, such as the Parisi (1975) model. Whereas many quantizers
of gravity like to stress this possibility of the non-perturbative renormalizability, in partic-
ular string theorists nevertheless keep up the analogy between non-renormalizable gravity
and non-renormalizable Fermi 4-theory – which was replaced by a renormalizable higher
energy theory – in demand for new, underlying structure to GR.32
Arguments for the non-perturbative renormalizability of gravity have been put forward
building on holography in one sense or another. The entropy argument by Shomer (2008) –
originally going back to Aharony and Banks (1999) – for instance tries to establish that d-
dimensional GR cannot be turned into a d-dimensional renormalizable quantum field theory
through cashing out an incompatibility of the Bekenstein-Hawking entropy formula with a
generic entropy formula for a renormalizable theory. However, arguably the semi-classical
presuppositions behind this reasoning, such as the violent extrapolation of the validity of
the Bekenstein-Hawking formula to high energies, render the argument problematic.33
Going beyond a mere stance on whether GR is renormalizable or not, Verlinde (2011)
even claims that today’s standard framework for renormalization, the Wilsonian framework,
is inapplicable to gravity. He points out that (1) Wilsonian renormalization rests on the
insensitivity of large scale physics from low scale physics, while (2) GR is sensitive to short
32In this tradition, Zee (2010) for instance pathetically asks: “Fermi’s theory cried out, and the new physics
turned out to be the electroweak theory. Einstein’s theory is now crying out. Will the new physics turn out to
be string theory?” (p. 157)
33Cf. Doboszewski and Linnemann (2017).
20
distance physics as it “knows” about the (number of) fundamental degrees of freedom
underlying gravity. The latter statement is based on holographic considerations, which
imply that there is a limited amount of underlying degrees of freedom associated to each
region of space. It is in this sense that gravity knows about the more fundamental level.
3.3 Black hole thermodynamics
Thermodynamic phenomena are standardly seen to be underlied by non-trivial microstruc-
ture.34 For instance, temperature is viewed as a measure of the averaged motion of un-
derlying particles, and in the Boltzmannian view entropy is a measure of the amount of
underlying microstates for a given macroscopic system. In this section we will explore
in how far the thermodynamic properties of black holes (and those of causal horizons in
general)35 can, as a consequence, be taken to hint at underlying microstructure of the
gravitational field. The structure of the argument can be formalized as follows:
1. Thermodynamic systems have underlying type II microstructure.
2. The laws of black hole mechanics are similar to those of thermodynamics.
3. ∴ Black hole spacetimes have underlying type II microstructure.
Note that not only the relationship between thermodynamics proper and black hole ther-
modynamics, but also the link between thermodynamics proper and type II microstructure
is far from uncontroversial, as we will point out in the following. However before we do
so, we mention a stronger version of the analogical argument, which is not based on black
hole thermodynamics but on the thermodynamic properties of local Rindler causal horizons
through each spacetime point. In the latter setup, Jacobson (1995) has derived the field
equations in GR from a thermodynamic first law that governs these local horizons, and
thereby he interpreted the Einstein equation as an equation of state. This seminal deriva-
tion suggests the following analogical argument (as also hinted at by Jacobson himself):
1. Thermodynamic systems have underlying type II microstructure.
2. At each point in spacetime the Einstein equation can be interpreted as a thermody-
namic equation of state.
3. ∴ The Einstein equation is due to underlying type II microstructure of GR.
34Whether thermodynamics is reducible – on the level of theories – to statistical mechanics is a slightly different
and highly intricate question. This is a long-lasting debate in the philosophy community.
35Cf. Jacobson and Parentani (2003).
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Table 1: Overview of the analogies between standard and black hole laws of thermodynamics
(largely taken from Kiefer (2007), p. 202)
Standard thermodynamics Black hole thermodynamics
Zeroth law: T constant on a body in thermal equilibrium κ constant on the horizon of a black hole
First law: dE = TdS − pdV + µdN dM = κ
8piG
dA+ ΩHdJ + ΦHdQ
Second law: dS ≥ 0 dA ≥ 0
Third law: T = 0 cannot be reached κ = 0 cannot be reached
Although this argument is more far-reaching than the first argument above, in the sense
that it applies to the full Einstein equation instead of a specific solution to it, the ther-
modynamics of local causal horizons is also less well established than that of black holes.
Therefore, in the rest of this section we will mostly focus on black hole thermodynamics.
Black hole thermodynamics consists of a group of laws, originally derived in general rel-
ativity by Bardeen et al. (1973), which are analogous to (variants of) the standard laws
of thermodynamics (see Table 1). Upon results from semi-classical calculations – espe-
cially the derivation of black hole temperature by Hawking (1975) – the temperature and
entropy featuring in the laws of black hole mechanics were accepted as proper thermody-
namic quantities. As a consequence, black hole thermodynamics as such was recognized by
the majority of the physics community as thermodynamics proper.36
Contra the received view, Dougherty and Callender (2016) identify two potential prob-
lems with black hole thermodynamics. First, they argue that the putative thermodynamic
laws of black holes only represent impoverished versions of the actual thermodynamic laws.
Second, they rightly point out that the information-theoretic interpretation of black hole
entropy stands in conflict with the standard non-epistemic interpretation of entropy in
thermodynamics. According to a non-epistemic view on thermodynamics, the description
of thermodynamic processes, such as heat cycles in engines, should not be subject to an
agent’s knowledge. However, proponents of black hole thermodynamics, such as Bekenstein
or Wald, largely maintain a purely agent-based, information-theoretic notion of entropy.
Bekenstein (1972), for example, justifies the attribution of entropy to the black hole horizon
by stating that otherwise information is lost for an agent when something has fallen through
the event horizon. There are, of course, ways to attack such an information-theoretic rea-
soning towards entropy, and an agent-based view on thermodynamics more generally (see
also Wu¨thrich (2017) for an appraisal of Bekenstein’s information theoretic argument).
Rather than taking a general stance in this debate, we are only interested in whether
it would have any effect on the analogical argument mentioned above. It seems to us
36See the textbook by Kiefer (2007) or review by Wald (2001).
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that, generally speaking, the analogical reasoning can still go through even if not all black
holes laws are proper thermodynamic laws. What seems most relevant to us is that the
analogy holds sufficiently with respect to the notions of entropy implemented in black hole
thermodynamics and thermodynamics proper. Hence, for the evaluation of the analogical
argument the decisive questions are (1) whether black hole entropy is a proper thermo-
dynamic entropy, and (2) whether thermodynamic entropy is linked to underlying type II
microstructure.
Let us first consider question (1). Against Dougherty and Callender (2016), recently
Prunkl and Timpson (2017), Curiel (2017) and Wallace (2017b) have argued for a stan-
dard thermodynamic take on black hole entropy. Prunkl and Timpson (2017) mention that
black holes can feature in thermodynamic Carnot cycles just like any other thermodynamic
system. Moreover, Wallace (2017b) stresses that in all relevant respects black hole ther-
modynamics is not at all conceptually worse off than thermodynamics proper (granting
of course that there is no empirical corroboration of black hole thermodynamics at the
moment, nor likely to be had in the near future). We do not want to repeat their specific
arguments here, but we take them to convincingly establish that black hole entropy is
thermodynamic entropy (in accordance with the consensus in the physics community).
With regard to question (2), Chirco et al. (2014) acknowledge that thermodynamic the-
ories – as far as we know – have microstructure, but claim that the underlying degrees of
freedom need not be novel or “hidden”. Thermal radiation, for example, has an underlying
microstructure which allegedly arises from quantization of the electromagnetic field, and is
hence not novel. Chirco et al. (2014) state that, by analogy, the microstructure underlying
black hole thermodynamics (or horizon thermodynamics) can arise from the quantization of
the metric field alone. We can defuse the sort of analogical reasoning at play here through
usage of our terminology: type I microstructure corresponds to no “hidden degrees of free-
dom” in the language of Chirco et al. (2014), whereas type II microstructure corresponds
to hidden degrees of freedom. Thermal radiation is underlied by electrodynamic fields, and
they in turn can be seen to be underlied by quantum electrodynamic structure. Quantum
electrodynamic structure is, thus, microstructure of type I with respect to classical elec-
trodynamic structure, but type II microstructure with respect to thermal radiation. There
is namely no sense in which electrodynamics can be seen to be inspired from radiation
thermodynamics. This contradicts the claim of Chirco et al. (2014) that thermal radiation
has type I microstructure (or no hidden degrees of freedom in their terminology). So their
analogical reasoning cannot even take off.
However, one could argue from LQG (as Chirco et al. (2014) do as well) or already
from effective quantum field theory that black hole spacetimes (or the gravitational metric
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structure per se) have type I microstructure simpliciter. Take the latter case: in an effective
quantum field theory view on GR, the Bekenstein-Hawking formula for entropy is derivable
from the partition function instantiated by the QFT path integral at play (see Gibbons and
Hawking (1977)). The calculation is formally in no way different from usual derivations
of entropy from the partition function in statistical mechanics (see for instance Wallace
(2017a) for a pedagogical introduction). But conceptually speaking, it must strike one
as odd that a mere formal analogy between QFT and statistical mechanics allows for
calculating a meaningful statistical mechanical property (i.e. entropy) from a quantum
field theoretic approach, without there being any meaningful quantum field theoretical
analogon to this property. However, if one accepts the partition function formally obtained
from a quantum field path integral as a true statistical mechanical object, one should
interpret the summation over different metric and matter fields in the partition function
as the usual summation over all possible microstates. This would mean that the quantum
structure obtained from quantizing the metric field of GR is sufficient microstructure to
explain its thermodynamic behaviour.
This quantum field theory approach is, however, in conflict with the typical statistical
mechanical derivation of thermodynamic entropy. The latter, namely, is based on type II
microstructure, such as the positions of particles for a gas. If black hole entropy is a
standard thermodynamic entropy then you might say that it also requires a standard
statistical mechanical explanation in terms of type II microstructure. String theory indeed
provides such a typical statistical mechanical derivation, because the Bekenstein-Hawking
formula has been derived by counting certain string microstates or D-brane configurations
(see Horowitz and Polchinski (2006) for a review). In other words, black hole entropy is
interpreted in string theory as Boltzmann entropy, and hence is due to underlying type II
microstructure. But, of course, we can only concur that it remains a physical possibility
that black hole entropy arises due to type I microstructure, such as entanglement (see also
Bianchi and Myers (2014) for a discussion on this topic).
3.4 Holographic principle
The holographic principle is generally viewed as an important guiding principle in the
search for a theory of quantum gravity. It puts a precise limit on the number of fundamental
degrees of freedom associated to spacetime regions, by stating that the maximal amount
of information inside a given spacetime region cannot exceed the area of its boundary
(measured in Planck units). In this section we are particularly interested in whether the
holographic principle entails anything about the nature of a putative microstructure of GR.
24
Before we explain how the principle might be viewed as a hint for type II microstructure
– and hence for emergent gravity – we first give a more precise definition of it.
The holographic principle, originally proposed by ’t Hooft (1993) and followed up by
Susskind (1995), is based on the following simple argument. Consider a spatial spherically
symmetric volume V in an asymptotically flat spacetime that is bounded by a surface B.
Now the entropy and number of degrees of freedom inside B are maximized if the volume
contains a black hole. This is because, if one tries to increase the entropy by putting in
more and more matter, at some point it will collapse into a black hole. As we saw in the
previous section, thermodynamical arguments suggest that black holes carry an entropy
proportional to their horizon area A(B). If one were to throw more matter into the black
hole, then its size would grow and it would not fit inside the surface B any more. Therefore,
by dropping the specific assumption of spherical symmetry and asymptotic structure, ’t
Hooft concluded that the number of degrees of freedom contained in any spatial region will
not exceed the area of the region’s boundary.
Later Bousso (2002) gave the holographic principle a covariant formulation. Firstly,
the holographic principle in its most general form does not hold for spacelike volumes,
but for light sheets and their associated spacelike boundary. Secondly, a rendering of the
holographic principle in terms of degrees of freedom already amounts to an interpretation
of (black hole) entropy in a general-relativistic setting. Whether entropy in a gravitational
context is due to a Boltzmannian-type counting procedure, due to entanglement across the
surface or even a third option, is however up to debate (string theorists typically promote
the first, LQG proponents favour the second one or even both at once, see Rovelli (2004)).
The interpretation-neutral version of the covariant entropy bound now reads as follows:
“The entropy on any light sheet of a surface B will not exceed the area of B”37
S[L(B)] ≤ kBc
3
~
A(B)
4G
.
Here L is a light sheet “constructed by following light rays that emanate from the [spacelike]
surface B, as long as they are not expanding”. The covariant entropy bound can be shown
to reduce to the original version of the holographic principle by ’t Hooft and Susskind for
spatial volumes and their associated boundary surfaces.
The holographic principle has led to important progress in quantum gravity research.
Already ’t Hooft put forward a much stronger statement than the entropy bound, namely
that all the fundamental degrees of freedom inside a region can be described by a quantum
mechanical theory living on the region’s boundary (which is now known as a holographic
37Bousso (2002), p. 19.
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duality). Such holographic duality relations have indeed been found, most notably the
AdS/CFT correspondence, and play a central role in quantum gravity research nowadays.
We want to stress though that the holographic principle (or, more precisely, the covariant
entropy bound) should not be conflated with holographic duality relations. The latter is
a conjecture about the equivalence of two, at first sight, unrelated theories, whereas the
former is a bound on the gravitational entropy.
Physicists often interpret the holographic relation as an emergent relation, in the sense
that a theory of gravity in a given spacetime emerges from a quantum theory without
gravity on the boundary. However, Dieks et al. (2015) and de Haro (2017a) among others38
worked out that emergence (also in our sense of underlying microstructure) and holographic
duality are prima facie independent notions. Only if the holographic duality is approximate
at a certain level, can it turn out that either the bulk or the boundary is more fundamental.
In the latter case, the bulk system can be seen to have underlying microstructure in terms
of the (microscopic) boundary system. The judge is still out, though, on whether the
AdS/CFT correspondence is an emergence relation or not, because it is still only proven
in a large N limit (for semi-classical bulk gravity).
We take it, however, that the holographic principle itself (and not just the specific
notion of holographic duality) already contains a hint for emergent gravity which may be
formalized roughly as follows (cf. the introduction of Bousso (2002) for a similar argument):
1. In a local QFT the total entropy of a spatial region scales with its volume.
2. The holographic principle implies that the total entropy associated to a spatial region
does not scale with its volume, but with the area of the boundary of the region.
3. ∴ The microtheory underlying gravity is non-local.
4. ∴ Non-local degrees of freedom are typically an example of type II microstructure.
Let us expand on this. We defined emergent gravity in section 2 by means of type II
microstructure. Now the holographic principle is not only concerned with the number of
fundamental degrees of freedom of quantum gravity, but it is also suggestive of the kind
of degrees of freedom that underly GR. As is well known, the holographic principle is in
conflict with the conventional wisdom in statistical mechanics or quantum field theory that
the number of degrees of freedom scales with the volume size of a system. Conventional
quantum field theories are interaction-local.39 Since degrees of freedom are linked to each
38See also the earlier work by Rickles (2013) and Teh (2013).
39By interaction locality, we mean what is more usually dubbed ‘micro-causality’, i.e. that spacelike separated
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spatial point, the information content of a spatial region grows with the volume. The
holographic principle, on the other hand, implies that the entropy is bounded by the
area of spacelike surfaces. Hence, the holographic principle casts doubt on the locality of
the fundamental degrees of freedom of gravity, and this might mean that the underlying
microstructure of GR is ‘non-trivial’ (or of type II).
Still, the non-locality of the underlying degrees of freedom does not need to imply
that the microstructure is of type II. It is true that in string theory, for example, black
hole entropy is accounted for by non-local fundamental objects such as strings and D-
branes. However, LQG (which is arguably a form of quantum GR) does for instance
feature interaction non-locality but is based on quantization of the standard gravitational
degrees of freedom. So whether the non-locality of the fundamental degrees of freedom is
a hint towards emergent gravity is not clear.
4 Conclusion: From hints to arguments
We have assessed four different hints for the emergent nature of gravity: (1) universal cou-
pling, (2) non-renormalizability, (3) black hole thermodynamics, and (4) the holographic
principle. Whether you take any of these hints to be strong indications in favour of an
emergent paradigm or not, depends to a good degree on (not fully uncontroversial) back-
ground assumptions. If you are committed to the geometric view, universal coupling is just
a consequence of the fact that gravity relates to the geometry of spacetime; whereas if you
favour a physical view of the metric field, universal coupling is suggestive of emergent grav-
ity. Likewise, whether quantum GR is renormalizable or not, or whether a proper quantum
gravity approach like LQG is able to cope with the holographic principle are open issues.
String theorists and quantum general relativity proponents are likely to take these issues to
be settled, although their answers will differ. Whether black hole thermodynamics on its
own is a hint, depends on whether black hole entropy can be explained through quantized
GR, or only by a type II microtheory such as string theory. And although Jacobson’s
reinterpretation of GR in terms of horizon thermodynamics provides a clear case of how
gravity can be due to underlying type II microstructure, this reinterpretation might be con-
tested. Having said this, we take it to have established why under acceptable background
assumptions the hints make a case for emergent gravity.
However, we do not want to limit ourselves to presenting a critical account of individual
suggestive features for emergent gravity, but rather strive forward by mounting exemplary
operator field values do not commute. For a scalar field φ, this means that [φ(x), φ(y)] = 0 provided that x and
y are spacelike separated points.
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analogical arguments based on these hints all together. For instance, the features of GR we
referred to as possible hints in the previous sections can star in an argument from example:
Argument from example
Models of hydrodynamics have features F1, ..., Fn.
Whenever a model of hydrodynamics applies to a domain of the world, a model
of a corresponding type II microtheory applies as well. In particular, there is
type II microstructure.
Models of thermodynamics have features F1, .., Fn.
Whenever a model of thermodynamics applies to a domain of the world, a model
of a corresponding type II microtheory applies as well. In particular, there is
type II microstructure.
Models of GR have features F1, ..., Fn.
∴ Whenever a model of GR applies to a domain of the world, a model of a
corresponding type II microtheory applies as well. In particular, there is type
II microstructure.
{F1, .., Fn} is a set of features including (1) thermodynamic aspects and (2) universality.
Another form of analogical argument which can be used in favour of emergent gravity is
Argument from likeness
Models of hydrodynamics and GR are similar with respect to features {F1, .., Fn}.
Models of hydrodynamics and GR are dissimilar with respect to features {G1, .., Gm}.
The features {F1, .., Fn} weigh out the features {G1, .., Gm}.
Whenever a model of hydrodynamics applies to a domain of the world, a model
of a corresponding type II microtheory applies as well. In particular, there is
type II microstructure.
∴ The models of hydrodynamics and GR are decisively similar. Hence, whenever
a model of GR applies to a domain of the world, a model of a corresponding type
II microtheory applies as well. In particular, there is type II microstructure.
where the set {G1, .., Gm} could include, for instance, background-independence.40
40GR is background-independent – see Belot (2011) for an explication of this notion – while (standard)
hydrodynamics is not.
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So, rather than assessing the strength of individual features, one could argue that sev-
eral features together make a stronger case than they would on their own. To assess the
strength of such holistic arguments, one standardly considers several criteria such as: the
number of similarities involved; the overall structural or syntactical similarity; common
causes or general laws featuring in analogies (strong causal ties/law-like relations in the
target domain and the source domain, respectively, are desired); usage of generalizations
(as little as possible); and the material analogy (concrete, observable similarities between
the source and the target domain are desirable).41 Applying these criteria to the argument
of likeness above, the partial lack of material analogy for certain similarities between GR
and hydrodynamics will strike some as problematic. Whereas, for instance, local thermo-
dynamic features of hydrodynamic theories have been observed (and are observable in a
straightforward sense), the same cannot be said about GR (black hole thermodynamics is
still awaiting direct empirical tests.) On the other hand, in particular the mere amount
of similarities between gravity and hydrodynamics, as well as their very nature – local
thermodynamics and universality are all law-like relations, albeit on a formal level – speak
in favour of the argument.
In our discussion of hints we left out two putative challenges standardly mentioned in
the context of emergent gravity: (1) the Weinberg-Witten theorem,42 and (2) the difficulty
of emergence of diffeomorphism invariant systems from non-diffeomorphism invariant ones.
These challenges have been sufficiently dealt with – or rather dismissed – elsewhere in
the literature (see Carlip (2014) for a dismissal of the Weinberg-Witten theorem as a
challenge to emergent gravity). That diffeomorphism invariant systems can emerge out of
non-diffeomorphism invariant systems, has been demonstrated both by the spin-2 account
and analogue gravity models as a proof of principle.
Concluding, we have taken up the challenge of making explicit arguments in favour
of an emergent gravity paradigm which are referred to in the literature or simply roam
around in the community. Needless to say, the depiction of the arguments at play cannot
give sufficient credit to all possible variants. Let us anticipate another possible objection,
namely that it is unfair to appraise arguments which are only meant as mere heuristics or
intuitions in the first place. However, we take this point to be ill-founded. That arguments
can only be plausibility arguments at the heuristic level, does not mean that they are
immune to scrutiny and critical assessment tout court. The philosopher’s of physics job in
41See Bartha (2016).
42The (second) theorem by Weinberg and Witten (1980) states that theories with a conserved, Lorentz covari-
ant stress-energy tensor cannot contain massless particles of spin j > 1. This rules out the possibility that the
graviton is an elementary or composite particle in an ordinary renormalizable quantum field theory. There are
several interesting ways to evade this theorem, as discussed for instance by Loebbert (2008) and Carlip (2014).
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the process of discovery of quantum gravity – so we believe – should amount to providing
exactly this kind of assessments. The current paper is our contribution to this effort.
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